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Abstract
This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark
and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the rst to leave the rm
(Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workerswages rise with seniority (= a
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c investments). There is
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workers, leading to a return to seniority in wages. E¢ ciency in hiring requires
the workersbargaining power to be in line with their share in the cost of specic
investment. Then, the LIFO rule is a way to protect their property right on
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1 Introduction
Why does Lars earn a lower wage than Jens, while they both do exactly the same
job, at the same rm, and with equal skills? And why is Pedro red when his
employer has to scale down employment and his colleague Miguel allowed to stay
at the rm, while again they do the same job? Some might think that the answer
to these questions is obvious: it is simply because Jens and Miguel have a longer
tenure at the rm than Lars and respectively, Pedro. Nevertheless, we do not know
of any paper within economics that establishes and justies these regularities. This
paper seeks to ll this gap and to provide a simple explanation for the occurrence
of these phenomena. Using matched worker-rm data for Denmark and Portugal,
we show that a worker who is hired last, is likely to be red rst (Last In, First
Out; LIFO). Analogously, we show that there is return to seniority in wages. In
both cases, our claims are di¤erent from saying that your tenure at the job a¤ects
negatively your job exit hazard or, respectively, a¤ects positively your wage. Seniority
is di¤erent from tenure in that it measures the workers tenure relative to the tenure
of her colleagues. Your seniority is your rank in the tenure hierarchy of the rm.
Hence, we need all-encompassing matched worker-rm data to establish a workers
seniority because we need to know the tenure of all the rms workers. Thus, when
we claim that seniority a¤ects your separation risk, we mean that on top of the
negative duration dependence of the hazard rate, being a senior worker with many
more junior colleagues has a further negative e¤ect. Similarly, when we claim that
there is a return to seniority in wages, we mean that on top of the return to tenure
as usually measured, there is return to seniority. We o¤er a simple economic theory
of why rms and workers would agree on applying a LIFO layo¤ rule and why that
leads to a return to seniority in wages. A LIFO layo¤ rule is a way to protect the
interests of incumbent insiders when hiring and training new workers. Without this
protection, the incumbents would have an incentive not to train any new worker. The
LIFO layo¤ rule provides protection against layo¤ for senior workers, and hence gives
these workers additional power to bargain for a higher wage, leading to a return to
seniority. To the extent that this return to seniority is a compensation for the worker
bearing part of the cost of specic investment in the relation between the worker and
the rm, the LIFO rule can be interpreted as a protection of the workers property
right on her specic human capital in the relation with the rm. We show that worker
turnover is maximal and the expected job duration is minimal when the surplus and
the cost of the specic investments are shared between the worker and the rm in
the same proportions, which is an application of the Hosios (1990) condition. In
some sense, stringent Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) acts as an articial
way to increase the specic investment in the relation, thereby reducing turnover and
increasing the expected job duration. Comparing Denmark and Portugal, we see that
Portugal has much more stringent EPL than Denmark, and in accordance with our
theoretical predictions, a much higher expected job duration than Denmark.
Our theory is based on a dynamic model of the rm with stochastic product
2
demand and irreversible specic investments for each newly hired worker, similar to
Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Dixit (1989) considers the same model, but then for an
individual worker. Labor demand follows a geometric random walk in these models.
Bentolila and Bertola calculate the optimal hiring and ring points, by considering,
for the current employment level, the expected discounted marginal revenue of hiring
an additional worker, accounting for the expected moment when it is e¢ cient to
re that worker, taking as given all workers currently employed by the rm and
disregarding any workers that might be hired in the future. In this way, the hiring
and ring of each worker can be considered separately of the hiring and ring of all
other workers, transferring a rm level model into a model of an individual worker,
as in Dixit (1989). This turns out to be equivalent to applying a LIFO separation
rule. Whereas Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Dixit (1989) take wages as given,
we allow for wage bargaining over the surplus generated by the specic investment.
Here, we apply an idea developed by Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989). They
start from the distinction in trade union theory between the right-to-manage model,
where the union bargains for wages above the market wage and the rm reduces its
labor demand in response to this higher wage (it has the right to manage) -leading to
an ine¢ ciently low employment- and the e¢ cient bargaining model, where the union
and the rm bargain simultaneously over wages and employment, so that employment
remains at its e¢ cient level. Kuhn and Robert observe that there is an alternative way
for workers to extract rents from the rm, while retaining both the right-to-manage
feature and e¢ ciency in employment setting. Their idea is to bargain for a layo¤
order and for a wage schedule where inframarginal workers get higher wages than
marginal workers. The rm cannot re the expensive inframarginal workers without
rst ring the cost e¤ective marginal workers. When this wage schedule is properly
set, the rm will pick the e¢ cient employment level. As a consequence of this setup,
equally productive workers receive di¤erent wages, just based on their position in the
layo¤ order, just like Lars and Jens in the opening sentence of this paper. Kuhn and
Robert elaborate their ideas in a static framework. Here, we introduce them in the
dynamic model of Bentolila and Bertola, leading to a return to seniority in wages. We
take an eclectic approach, that is, we do not start from an explicit bargaining game,
but from positing a log linear sharing rule of the surplus of the specic investment.
However, we impose one feature that characterizes Nash bargaining, namely e¢ cient
bargaining: as long as there is a surplus, the worker and the rm will be able to agree
on a distribution of that surplus that makes continuation of the relation mutually
benecial. This guarantees that there is e¢ ciency on the ring side. However, the
e¢ ciency of hiring decisions depends on a di¤erent issue, namely the Hosios condition,
which requires the surplus generated by the specic investment to be shared between
the worker and the rm in the same proportions as their shares in the cost of the
investment. If not, hiring is below the e¢ cient level due to a hold up problem. We
elaborate our model under the assumption that the rm must pay for the full cost
of the specic investment, so that any return to seniority implies sub-e¢ cient hiring.
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Under risk neutrality, contractibility of either specic investment or wages su¢ ces to
achieve e¢ ciency, since we can always satisfy the Hosios condition by using one to
match the other. When workers are risk averse, any return to seniority is ine¢ cient,
as it assigns the worker a risky return that can better be assigned to the risk neutral
rm. As an extension, we consider the e¤ect of ring cost, accounting for its upward
e¤ect on wages.1 By the e¢ cient bargaining assumption and the Coase theorem, ring
cost does not a¤ect ring, but further deteriorates hiring. Finally, we consider the
role of trade unions in this model. The ideas in Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert
(1989) seem to suggest that the return to tenure should be higher in unionized rms,
since unions are predicted to use the tenure prole as a rent extraction mechanism.
This turned out to be counter-factual: unionized rms generally have a lower return
to tenure, not a higher return, see for instance Teulings and Hartog (1998: 225). We
observe that this ts our theory. Incumbent workers have su¢ cient bargaining power
to extract returns to their seniority even in the absence of a formal union: their
cooperation is indispensable when the rm wants to transfer the tacit knowledge
to newly hired workers. The LIFO layo¤ rule allows for a decentralisation of the
bargaining process, leading to higher wages for senior workers. Instead, the political
process within a union would lead to a more egalitarian distribution of the rents
among the workers, that is, to higher wages but a lower wage return to seniority.
In the empirical part, we establish a number of features of our model. We show
that seniority is an important determinant of job separation. Junior workers have
a larger separation probability than senior workers. This e¤ect comes on top of
the duration dependence of the hazard, that is, in addition to the fact that the
separation probability declines with the elapsed tenure at the job. Second, we show
that there is a wage return to seniority. Starting from the seminal papers by Altonji
and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991), there is a large and still ourishing literature
on the estimation the wage return to tenure. The problem in this literature is that
within a job spell, tenure is perfectly correlated with experience. Hence, the rst
order term of this return can only be estimated using variation between job spells,
but that introduces all kind of selectivity problems, which this literature sets out to
resolve. This problem is absent in the estimation of the return to seniority, since
seniority is not perfectly correlated with experience. Seniority increases for example
because new workers enter the rm. From that perspective, changes in seniority
are correlated with changes in rm size, since an increase in rm size requires new
workers to be hired and, hence, the seniority of the incumbents to increase. Luckily
however, seniority is not perfectly correlated to rm size, since then the return to
seniority could not be disentangled from the rm size wage e¤ect: seniority does also
increase by more senior workers leaving the rm, for example due to retirement. In
our regressions, we use within job spell variation and we include both tenure and rm
size as controls. Nevertheless, we are still able to nd wage returns to seniority of 1 to
1In Bentolila and Bertolas (1990) analysis of the e¤ect of ring costs, wages are xed. Accounting
for the e¤ect on wage setting turns out to be important for the conclusions.
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2 % in Portugal, and returns half that range in Denmark. Including seniority reduces
the coe¢ cients for tenure and rm size by 5-30 %, suggesting that tenure and rm
size served at least partly as proxies for seniority in previous regressions. The return
to seniority turns out to be of the same order of magnitude for males and females,
but much larger for high than for low educated workers. Our theory also implies that
returns to seniority are higher in industries with a high degree of monopoly power.
We make an attempt to test this prediction, but our explanatory variables proxying
for monopoly power are not strong enough to nd an e¤ect.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework.
In Section 3, we describe the data and the relevant labour market institutions in
Denmark and Portugal, and we present our estimation results. Section 4 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Setup
The model of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) provides a nice starting point for our
analysis. Firms face a stochastic iso-elastic demand curve for their output, in logs:
nt = zt   pt; (1)
where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, nt is log demand, pt is its log price,
and zt is a market index capturing the exogenous evolution of demand; zt is assumed
to follow a Brownian with drift, such that z  N (; 2). Labor is the only factor
of production. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Without
loss of generality, productivity is normalized to unity, so that output is equal to
employment. In the model of Bentolila and Bertola (1990), hiring and ring of workers
is costly. At this stage, we focus on hiring cost, denoted by I. This cost is interpreted
more broadly as the specic investment that has to be made by the rm at the start
of an employment relation. It is irreversible: once made, the cost cannot be recouped
by ending the employment relation. For simplicity, we assume that this investment
can be made instantaneously, so that no time elapses between the start and the end of
the investment process. At the outside market, workers can earn a reservation wage,
which is constant over time. It is most convenient to think of this reservation wage as
the return to self employment. Without loss of generality, it is normalized to unity.
Hence wr = 0, where wr denotes the log reservation wage. We assume both workers
and rms to be risk neutral.
As a benchmark, we analyze rst the simple case where rms pay workers their
reservation wage and where there are no specic investments required for starting an
employment relation, I = 0. In that case, labor demand can be adjusted costlessly at
each point in time. Hence, the optimal strategy is to maximize instantaneous prots
t:
t = e
nt (ept   1) ;
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subject to the demand curve (1). The rst order condition implies
pt= ;
mr (zt   nt) = 1

(zt   nt)  ; (2)
nt= zt   ;
 ln 
   1 > 0:
where mr (zt   nt) denotes the log of the marginal revenue for the rm of hiring an
additional worker, conditional on the state of demand zt and log employment nt. The
parameter  is the log of the ratio of price over wage cost, when marginal cost and
marginal revenue are equal. This ratio is greater than unity due to the monopoly
power of the rm at the product market. The rms price is constant over time, while
its labor demand follows a random walk. The latter implication is consistent with
Gibrats law that tends to hold for large rms, see for instance Jovanovic (1982).
Next, consider the optimal strategy with specic investments, I > 0. Then,
labor demand cannot be adjusted costlessly. On the hiring side, an additional worker
requires a specic investment, which has to be recouped from future prots. Moreover,
this investment is irreversible, so that delaying hiring has an option value. On the
ring side, ring per se is costless, but irreversible. If demand surges after having
red the worker, the rm is unable to benet from that demand without incurring
the cost of the specic investment again. Hence, retaining the worker has an option
value, too. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) show that the optimal policy of a rm is to
hire workers whenever pt reaches a constant upper bound p+ >  and to re them
whenever pt reaches a lower bound p  < . The hiring bound p+ exceeds  due to
the necessity for the rm to recoup the cost of specic investments and due to the
option value of postponing hiring, while the ring bound p  is below  due to the
option value of postponing ring. The situation is sketched in Figure 1. below.
Figure 1: Firing-hiring boundaries with stochastic market index
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The present employment level is denoted by n0 and the present market index by
z0. If the market index rises above z+, the rm hires additional workers to avoid p
rising above p+. If the market index falls below z , the rm res workers to avoid
p falling below p . Hence, pt follows a random walk between p  and p+, while nt
is constant in this interval. However, when pt drifts outside these boundaries, the
rm uses nt as an instrument to control pt. Then, pt is held constant, and nt starts
drifting, either up (if p = p+), or down (if p = p ). Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
provide expressions for both boundaries.
Suppose we impose a LIFO separation rule upon this rm. We can index each
worker by the log employment level of the rm at the date that the worker is hired.
A worker hired at time h gets rank q, q = nh = zh   p+. Her seniority index at
time t is dened as nt  q. The less senior the worker, the shorter her tenure, and the
lower her seniority index nt   q. Hence, the most senior worker q = 0 has seniority
index nt   q = nt, while the least senior worker at time t with q = nt has seniority
index nt   q = 0. The LIFO layo¤ rule implies that a worker hired at time h with
index nt   nh, will be red at the rst moment f > h that employment is back at
the level nh and pf = p , that is, when zf   zh =   (p+   p ). By construction, f
is the rst point in time that zt has travelled down a distance  (p+   p ) from its
initial value zh. Whether or not new workers have been hired after time h by zt rising
above zh for some t; h < t < f , and if so, how many, is immaterial to this conclusion,
since these workers are indexed nf   nt < nf   nh, and hence, the LIFO separation
rule imposes that these workers will be red before the worker with seniority nf  nh.
Bentolila and Bertolas model of rm level employment supplemented with a LIFO
layo¤ rule corresponds one-to-one with a simple model of individual job tenures. In
this model, a worker hired at time h, with zt = zh, will be red a the rst time that zt
has travelled down a distance  (p+   p ); see Buhai and Teulings (2005) for a recent
elaboration of that model.
2.2 Rationale for LIFO
Why would a rm use a LIFO layo¤ strategy? In the simple world discussed above,
where the rm pays the worker her reservation wage, there is no rationale for such
a rule. Since the worker receives her reservation wage, she is indi¤erent between
working at the rm or being laid o¤. Hence, there is no point in xing an order
of layo¤. However, if we relax the assumption that the rm pays its workers their
reservation wage and we attribute incumbent workers some bargaining power, the
quasi rents of the specic investment enable these workers to capture wages above the
reservation wage. In that case, a layo¤ order carries practical relevance, as it protects
the rightsof senior workers (those who are hired rst). Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and
Robert (1989) o¤er a neat further legitimation for using such a rule. Their idea is
based on the classic distinction in the theory of unionized wage setting between right-
to-manage or labour demand curve models, on the one hand, and e¢ cient bargaining
models, on the other hand. In the former, unions raise wages above the reservation
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wage. However, the rm can set employment unilaterally ("the rm has the right to
manage"). From the point of view of the rm, wages are equal to marginal cost.
Hence, the higher wage rate reduces the rms labour demand. This outcome has been
criticized for leaving gains from trade between the rm and the workers unexploited.
Additional workers would be willing to join the rm at a wage rate between the
reservation wage and the negotiated wage, and the rm would be willing to hire them
at that wage. By bargaining on wages and employment simultaneously, the rm and
the union can exploit these gains from trade. Kuhn and Roberts idea is that these
gains from trade can also be exploited, while maintaining the right-to-manage feature
that wages are negotiated between the rms and the union (or: its workers) and
that the rm sets employment unilaterally. This can be done by xing the order of
layo¤, and di¤erentiating wages by the position in the layo¤ order. A rm can only
re senior workers after having rst red all junior workers. Senior workers earn the
highest wage since they can only be red after all juniors been red and therefore
they feel su¢ ciently protected to demand higher pay, any resultant job loss falling on
their less senior colleagues. This is a form of price discrimination on the side of the
union. First degree price discrimination results when the union has full bargaining
power. Inframarginal senior workers receive part of their inframarginal productivity
surplus.
Kuhn and Robert (1989) specify their theory in static framework. In that case,
the layo¤ ordering can be based on any variable, height, IQ, experience, or what else
springs to mind. Combining the model of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) with a LIFO
layo¤ ordering provides a straightforward way to cast the ideas of Kuhn and Robert
in a dynamic framework. Then, the prevalence of a LIFO ordering has a natural
economic interpretation. The senior workers future wage claims are sensitive to the
rm hiring new workers, since after the specic investments have been made, these
new workers are perfect substitutes for senior workers. The rm could in principle
hire new workers for a low wage, and re the senior workers instead. The lack of
commitment on the side of the rm of not benetting from this strategic option has
an adverse e¤ect on the set of feasible contracting arrangements open to the rm and
its workers. Suppose that the specic investment of new workers is largely made up
from acquiring the tacit knowledge of the rms production process and the transfer
of this knowledge can be blocked by senior workers, or suppose that senior workers
can harass newcomers, as suggested by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). In that case,
hiring new workers requires the consent of senior workers. At the same time, the rm
has a commitment problem: how can it credibly promise senior workers not to use
new workers as a replacement for them, after the transfer of the tacit knowledge to
the new workers is completed? Due to this commitment problem, gains from trade
from hiring new workers cannot be exploited. A LIFO separation rule is a solution
to this commitment problem by providing senior workers protection against being
laid o¤ before newly hired workers, so that there are no disincentives to cooperate in
training new workers.
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2.3 Wage sharing rule
We operationalize the LIFO idea by positing a linear relation for the log wage as a
function of the current state of product demand zt and the seniority index nt   q:
w(zt   q) = ! + 

 
zt   q   p 

(3)
where 0 <  < 1 and where ! is the log wage at which a worker is indi¤erent between
remaining employed at the rm and being laid o¤, given the LIFO layo¤ rule and
equation (3). The parameter ! can therefore be interpreted as the reservation wage
of an incumbent worker. We shall derive an expression for it below, when discussing
the workers problem. At the moment of ring the worker with seniority index nt  q,
it must be true that zt = q + p , by the denition of the ring bound. The factor
 1 (zt   p    q) is equal tomr (zt   q), the log of surplus of marginal revenue above
marginal cost, compare expression (2), conditional on employment being equal to the
workers seniority index nt q; that is, if there were no workers in the rm with higher
seniority, or equivalently, there is nobody in the rm with a lower tenure than worker
zt q. This marginal revenue is a counterfactual, in the sense that actual employment
can be larger, nt  q. We can therefore just as well refer to this "marginal" revenue
as the "infra marginal" revenue, because it would be the marginal revenue only if the
rm were rst to re all workers with a higher q. Equation (3) implies that senior
workers receive a share  of this surplus of log inframarginal revenue above the log
marginal outside option. The parameter  can be interpreted as the bargaining power
of workers, though strictly speaking this interpretation lacks a foundation in a formal
bargaining model.2 The log linearity of equation (3) is just imposed for the sake of
analytical convenience. Equation (3) implies e¢ cient bargaining: as long as there
is a positive surplus both parties get a share of it, so that it is rational for both to
continue the employment relation. As soon as the surplus is vanished, separation will
occur, which by then is the e¢ cient outcome. Note that equation (3) depends on
zt  q, not on zt and q separately. Since zt is closely related to log rm size nt (apart
from the e¤ect of insulating nt from uctuations in zt whenever pt is in between the
hiring and ring bounds, p+ and p ), zt q can be interpreted as an index of seniority
relative to rm size. The return to the seniority index (or simpler, to seniority), =,
is increasing in the bargaining power of the workers, , and in the monopoly power
of the rm on its product market,  1. Since 0 <  < 1 and  > 1, the elasticity of
wages with respect to the index nt   q; =; must be between zero and unity.
2.4 The workers problem
The value of ! can be derived using the theory of option values, see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). Let V (zt   q) be the asset value of holding a job at a rm. By Itos lemma
2In the case of a single worker rm, where we could apply the theory of two player bargaining,
as in Buhai and Teulings (2005), the log linear sharing rule would be almost equivalent to Nash
bargaining, which would yield a linear sharing rule.
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V (zt   q) satises the Bellman equation
V (zt   q) = ew(zt q) + V 0 (zt   q) + 1
2
2V 00 (zt   q) ;
where  is the interest rate, such that  > + 1
2
2; ew(zt q) is the current wage. The
relevant solution to this second order di¤erential equation reads
V (zt   q) = 1
r (=)
exp

! +


 
zt   q   p 

+ A exp

  (zt   q)

;
r (x)   x  1
2
(x)2 ) r (0) = ; r (1) =     1
2
2 > 0
+;  =2 
p
2=4 + 2=2 )   < 0; + > 1:
where we substitute w (zt   q) for equation(3) and where A is a constant of integration
that remains to be determined. r (x) is a modied discount rate, accounting for
the drift and the variability of zt; note that r (0) = ; r (1) must be positive for a
bounded solution for the welfare of the worker to exist. Hence, the rst term is the
net discounted value of expected wage payments, disregarding the workers option
to quit the rm when wages fall too far below the reservation wage. The second
term, A exp

+; zt

, is the option value of separation. Only one of the roots +;  is
relevant here. For large values of zt, the rm is doing well and, hence, keeping the job
is attractive for the foreseeable future. The option value of separation must converge
to zero, which is the case for the negative root  , since limz!1A exp

 z

= 0.
Hence, the constant of integration for the positive root + is equal to zero. E¢ cient
bargaining implies that it is optimal for the worker to separate when zt = q + p .
Two conditions to hold for that value of zt to be optimal: the value matching and
the smooth pasting condition. The value matching condition states that the asset
value of holding the job should be equal to the asset value after separation, that is,
the net discounted value of the reservation wage,  1. The smooth pasting condition
states that for small variations in zt, the worker remains indi¤erent between holding
the job and separation, since the worker should not regret separation after a small
perturbation of zt because separation is irreversible. This requires the rst derivative
of V (zt   q) with respect to zt to be zero. Using zt   q = p  at the moment of
separation, both conditions read
V
 
p 

=
1
r (=)
e! + Ae
 z =
1

; (4)
V 0
 
p 

=

r (=)
e! +  Ae
 z = 0;
!= ln r (=)  ln   ln

1  
 

< 0;
where the nal equation follows from the elimination of A from the rst two. ! is
below the log reservation wage wr = 0 since separation is an irreversible decision. If
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the demand for the rms product, zt, goes up after the separation decision, the worker
is no longer able to benet from the wage increase. Hence, workers are prepared to
incur some loss before they decide to separate. The higher the workers share  in the
log surplus, the lower is !, since expected future revenues are higher so that workers
are prepared to accept greater losses before separation. Similarly, ! is declining in
the drift , since a higher drift raises expected future revenues, and it is declining
in the variability of demand 2, since a higher variability raises the option value of
hoping for a future increase in the surplus.
2.5 The rms problem
Given this wage setting rule, we derive the rms optimal strategy. We use a method-
ology that is similar to Bentolila and Bertola (1990). We attribute to each worker her
marginal revenue and her wage, taken the employment of workers hired previously as
given, and then consider when it is optimal for the rm to hire and subsequently re
this worker. In this way, we can consider the decision to hire and re the Nt-th worker
(Nt  expnt) separately of the hiring and ring of workers hired before this worker,
and of workers hired afterwards. Then, the model is a straightforward extension of
Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 216), the only di¤erence being that wages are constant in
Dixit and Pindyck, while they vary with the state of demand zt in this model. Let
F (nt; zt) be the asset value of the rm for the Nt-th worker. The Bellman equation
for F (nt; zt) satises
F (nt; zt) = exp [mr (zt   nt)]  exp [w (zt   nt)]+Fz (nt; zt)+ 1
2
2Fzz (nt; zt) : (5)
The rst term is the marginal revenue of that worker, see equation (2), the second
term is the wage for that worker. The relevant solution to this di¤erential equation
reads
F (nt; zt)=
1
r ( 1)
exp

1

(zt   nt)  

  1
r (=)
exp [w (zt   nt)]
+B  exp

  (zt   nt)

:
The nal term is the option value of separation, with B  being the constant of
integration. As in the case of the worker, the positive root + is irrelevant, since the
option value must converge to zero for large values of zt (since then the option to re
the worker has no value). Suppose the rm employs less than Nt workers. Then, the
option value of hiring the Nt-th worker at some future date reads
G (nt; zt) = B
+ exp

+ (zt   nt)

;
where B+ is the constant of integration. There are no current costs or revenues, hence
only the option value term matters. Since this option value converges to zero for low
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values of zt, here only the positive root 
+ applies. The value matching and smooth
pasting conditions read
F
 
zt   p ; zt

=G
 
zt   p ; zt

; (6)
Fz
 
zt   p ; zt

=Gz
 
zt   p ; zt

;
F
 
zt   p+; zt

=G
 
zt   p+; zt

+ I;
Fz
 
zt   p+; zt

=Gz
 
zt   p+; zt

:
The rst pair refers to the ring decision, the second to the hiring decision. The rst
condition states that at the moment of ring, when by denition nt = zt   p , the
asset value of keeping the worker is equal to the option value of a vacancy. The second
equation is the smooth pasting condition, which states that this condition also applies
for slight variations of zt, so that rm wouldnt regret a decision to re after a slight
variation in zt. The third equation is the value matching condition for the moment
of hiring, when nt = zt  p+: the asset value of hiring the worker should be equal to
the cost of investment and option value of lling the vacancy at a later point in time.
The nal equation is the smooth pasting conditions for the moment of hiring. This
system of four equations determines four unknowns, the constants of integration, B 
and B+, and the hiring and ring boundaries, p  and p+. This system is non-linear,
and its analysis is relegated to Appendix A, where we prove the subsequent results.
A unique, economically meaningful solution to this system exists, where B  > 0 and
B+ > 0, and where p+ > 0 > p . The elimination of B  from the rst two equations
of (6) yields
p  = ln r
 
 1
 ln + ln    1
 

 ln

1  
+    
 
B+ exp

+p 

: (7)
The ring bound p  does not depend on , except for the e¤ect of  on B+, which
is the option value of relling the vacancy at a later moment. This is an application
of the Coase theorem: under the e¢ cient bargaining, the distribution of the surplus
of the employment relation does not matter for the actual level of employment. The
option value of rehiring comes in because when the rm decides to re the Nt-th
worker, it always has the option to rehire at a later moment. The larger the distance
between the hiring and ring threshold, p+ p , the longer it will take (in expectation)
before the rm will nd it attractive to rell the vacancy, and hence the smaller is
the option value associated with that. Keeping constant all other parameters of the
model, an increase in the bargaining power of the workers  raises the distance p+ p 
d [p+   p ]
d
> 0:
The higher the workersbargaining power , the less volatile will be the employment,
since employment is insulated from shocks in demand zt over a larger interval of
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p  < nt   zt < p+, and the larger is therefore the expected tenure of a newly
hired worker. This is the consequence of a hold up problem. The larger the workers
bargaining power, the higher the hiring threshold p+, since the rm reaps a smaller
share of future surpluses created by the specic investments in new workers, so that
a larger initial surplus of marginal revenue above the reservation wage is required
to recoup the cost of these investments. Since p+   p  is larger, the option value of
rehiring is lower, and hence the ring threshold p  is lower, though this indirect e¤ect
of  on p  is smaller than the direct e¤ect on p+. Hence, a higher bargaining power
of workers reduces the ring threshold and postpones separation. This implication
squares well with the ndings in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), who show that
when rms are insulated from takeovers, the wages of the incumbent employees are
higher, suggesting a higher value of . This goes hand in hand with lower rates of
creation of new plants, which in the context of our model is similar to hiring new
workers. Bertrand and Mullainathan also report a lower rate of destruction of old
plants, or in the context of our model, a lower ring bound, p . The larger is , the
lower is the option value of future rehiring, and hence the less attractive it is to re
a worker.
2.6 Explanation of the rm size wage e¤ect?
The rm size e¤ect on wages has been extensively documented, see Brown and Medo¤
(1989). Can our model o¤er an explanation for the rm size wage e¤ect? When we
look at the issue from the point of view of an individual worker, the evolution of her
seniority nt  q is driven by the evolution of log rm size nt. In reality workers retire
at some point in time. When more senior workers retire, a workers seniority goes up
even at constant rm size. Here, we abstract from retirement, so that rm size is the
only driver of changes in seniority. At rst sight, this suggests that our theory could
explain the rm size wage e¤ect. Nevertheless, this turns out not to be true. The
average log wage in a rm at the ring bound p  satises
e nt
Z nt
 1
w(zt   q)eqdq = e nt
Z nt
 1

! + =
 
zt   q + 1  p 

eqdq = ! + =;
where in the nal equality we use the fact that at the ring bound, nt = zt   p .
Hence, the average log wage does not depend on rm size. The intuition is that the
positive e¤ect of the wage increase for the incumbent workforce is exactly o¤set by
the negative e¤ect of the below average log wage for the new hires. Thus, although
this model predicts rm size to be a driver for the changes in the wages of incumbent
workforce, it does not explain why wages for the rm as a whole depend on rm size.
However, the average log wage does depend on the parameter =. Other things
equal (in particular, human capital of the workforce), the model predicts the return
to seniority, =, to be increasing in the average log wage.
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2.7 Who gets hired and the welfare cost of hold up
To close the model, we have to explain who gets hired by a rm and who does not.
The log wage of a worker who is just hired is higher than the wage of a worker who
is at the borderline of being laid o¤, that is
w
 
zt   p+; zt

> w
 
zt   p ; zt

= !:
Since the asset value of a worker who is on the borderline of being laid o¤ is equal
to the net present value of her reservation wage, 1=, the asset value of a worker
who is just hired must be higher than 1=. Hence, new jobs at the rm are rationed.
A convenient way to model this rationing process is to introduce unemployment. A
worker who is just laid o¤has two options. Either she can decide to collect her outside
wage by becoming self employed, or she can decide to queue for a new job at a rm.
During this waiting period she cannot produce as a self employed. For simplicity, we
assume that leisure has no value.3 New jobs at rms arrive at a rate  per unit of the
labor force and are distributed randomly among the unemployed. Hence, the asset
value of unemployment, V U , satises
V U =

u

V
 
p+
  V U ;
where u is the unemployment rate. =u is the arrival rate of a new job for unemployed.
The lower unemployment, the higher this arrival rate, since there are less people
among whom new jobs have to be distributed. V (p+)   V U is the asset gain of
getting a job o¤er. The level of unemployment follows from the no-arbitrage condition
between self employment and unemployment
u = 

V
 
p+
  1


; (8)
where we use V U = 1=, the asset value of self employment4. The higher the asset
gain of getting a job at a rm, the higher must be unemployment. Though the
e¢ cient bargaining assumption generates e¢ ciency in the layo¤ decision of rms, it
does not achieve e¢ ciency on the hiring side. There are two types of ine¢ ciency.5
First, not all gains from trade between the worker and the rm are exploited. Firms
would hire more workers if  = 0, since p+ is an increasing function of . Firms
3Allowing for a value of leisure would not change the predictions of model. It would make
unemployment less costly per unit of time, but this e¤ect would be exactly o¤set by the rise in
unemployment.
4We assume: u < 1. If u > 1, the outside option of self employment would become irrelevant,
and the reservation wage ! and job arrival rate  would become endogenous. ! would rise till so
many workers are red, and so few workers are hired till  is such that the no arbitrage condition
holds for u = 1.
5Throughout the paper, we do not pay attention to a third type, the ine¢ ciency caused by the
monopoly power of the rm vis-a-vis consumers.
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perception of the marginal cost of hiring a worker in net present value terms exceeds
the social cost by the same amount as the asset gain for an unemployed of getting
a job o¤er, V (p+)   1=. This gives rise to a Harberger triangle. Next to this
Harberger triangle, there are the cost of rationing that dissipate workers surplus.
The no-arbitrage condition (8) implies that the workers as a group spoil their whole
share in the quasi rents in wasteful unemployment.
The ine¢ ciency problem arises by a violation of the Hosios (1990) condition.
Workers are able to capture a share of the quasi rents of the specic investments,
while they do not bear a corresponding share of the burden of the investment cost.
Hence, rms restrain new hiring to push up the net present value of all rents of a
new hire above the cost I till their share in the rent su¢ ces to recoup the cost. The
ine¢ ciency is due to the non-veriability of specic investment and the inability of
workers to commit on not using their bargaining power after the specic investment
has been made. If wages were contractible, workers could commit on not demanding
any return to seniority, so that the rm bears the full cost and gets the full revenues
of the specic investment, thereby satisfying the Hosios condition. Alternatively,
if specic investments were veriable, the ine¢ ciency would be resolved by shifting
some share of the burden of investment to the worker, such that workers bear an
equal share of cost of the specic investment as they get from its revenues, again
satisfying the Hosios condition. For the latter case, note that the asset value of a
worker at the moment of hiring, V (p+), is independent of the moment of hiring.
Hence, although at a particular point in time senior workers get more quasi rents
than juniors, at the moment of hiring each worker has the same net present value
of expected rents, independent of her rank q, that is, independent of the level of
employment at the moment she is hired. Seniors getting higher rents than juniors at
a particular point in time reects the fact that they are able to realize the upside of the
risky returns on their share in the specic investment I. Hence, the LIFO separation
rule can be interpreted as a protection of their property right on their share in the
quasi rents, against the temptation of the rm to re the expensive senior workers,
thereby depriving them from the upside of their risky returns. A LIFO separation
rule is then a device for implementing an e¢ cient contract. This argument implies
that as long as we do not know what share of the cost of specic investment is born by
workers, empirical evidence supporting the relevance of equation (3) for wage setting
is inconclusive on the issue of whether or not employment is below its ine¢ cient level.
Finally, note that when workers have to pay the full cost of the specic invest-
ment, the hold up problem is precisely the reverse. Then, the non-veriability of
workers investment and the inability of rms to commit on not using their bargaining
power 1    leads to ine¢ ciency. Workers are only willing to enter the rm when
the net present value of quasi rents of their investment are so high that their share
in this present value su¢ ces to cover the cost of investment. There is a simple sta-
tistic enabling the observer to establish which side is overcompensated in the ex post
bargaining over the surplus of the specic investment: when workers queue for jobs,
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so that there is unemployment, rms are held up, as in the basic model; when rms
chase after workers, so that there are vacancies, workers are held up.
2.8 Extensions
Some extensions to this model are worth discussing. First, relaxing the assumption
of risk neutrality on the side of the worker introduces a trade o¤. As discussed in the
previous section, veriability of the specic investment I is su¢ cient to implement
rst best in the standard case with risk neutral workers. With risk averse workers,
this conclusion no longer applies. First best requires that workers get paid their
reservation wage all the time, and hence that rms bear the full cost of investment.
The inability of workers to commit on not using their bargaining power makes rst
best unattainable in that case. The case of risk averse workers and risk neutral rms
is particularly relevant because one can expect capital markets to be much more
complete for rms than for workers. It is much easier for the rm to diversify rm
specic risks on the capital market than for its workers.
A second extension is the introduction of ring cost, imposed either by law or by
trade unions. We think of a ring cost as a wealth transfer W from the rm to the
worker at the moment of ring. By the assumption of e¢ cient wage bargaining, this
wealth transfer has an impact on the wage bargaining process. The value matching
condition of the worker for the moment of ring reads, compare equation (4)
V
 
p 

=
1

+W ) ! = ln r (=)  ln   ln

1  
 

+ ln (1 + W ) < 0: (9)
Firing cost raise value of the outside option of the worker by the wealth transfer W .
This raises !. Hence, there are two counteracting e¤ects on the ring bound p+: the
direct e¤ect of ring cost makes layo¤s less attractive to the rm, while the indirect
e¤ect via higher wages makes layo¤s more attractive, since workers are more costly
due to the higher level of !. The rst order condition for optimal ring now reads,
compare equation (6)
Fz
 
zt   p ; zt

= G
 
zt   p ; zt

+W;
where we use the value of ! from equation (9) to account for the e¤ect of ring cost
on wages. Some calculation, see Appendix A, shows that the value for p  remains the
same as in equation (7). The direct and the indirect e¤ect cancel therefore exactly,
except for the indirect e¤ect via B+, the option value of rehiring. Again, this is an
implication of the e¢ cient bargaining assumption and the Coase theorem. On the
hiring side, ring cost has two e¤ects with the same sign: rst, it raises wages via
its e¤ect on ! and, second, there is the prospect of having to pay ring cost in case
of future layo¤. To the extent that workers have excessive bargaining power, in the
sense that the net present value of their share in the surplus exceeds the share in the
cost of specic investment, which shows up as workers queueing for a job and hence
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as unemployment, this increase comes to the detriment of e¢ ciency. The paradox
here is that ring costs aggravate the unemployment problem that they were meant
to resolve. Since the hiring threshold p+ goes up due to the introduction of ring
cost, the expected value of future rehiring is lower, so the ring threshold is lower.
Hence, ring cost raises the distance p+   p  and therefore the expected tenure of
newly hired workers.
Now that we have discussed these extensions, risk aversion and ring cost, it
makes sense to consider the nature of workersbargaining power. Most economists
associate this power with the trade unions.6 Only unions provide workers bargaining
power. Without unions, rms are supposed to have complete bargaining power. A
notable exception is the article by Lindbeck and Snower (1990), who point out that
the insidersability to harass new hires gives them bargaining power vis-a-vis their
employer. Without the insidersconsent, rms are e¤ectively unable to introduce new
hires. The interesting aspect of Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) is that
their rank related compensation scheme allows a decentralization of the bargaining
process. As soon as the layo¤order has been set, each worker can negotiate for herself.
When a marginal worker negotiates a wage increase raising her wage above marginal
cost, she endangers her own employment, not that of the inframarginal workers.7
Hence, a LIFO scheme enables workers to exploit their individual bargaining power
without workers having to solve their collective action problem. When workers are
united in a trade union, more elaborate strategies are available, that yield a higher
expected payo¤, in particular when workers are risk averse. By trading a higher
transfer W; in case of layo¤, in exchange for a lower seniority premium, such that the
rms asset value F (nt; zt) remains the same, the expected utility for new hires can
be improved by shifting the rm specic risk zt to the rm. The transfer W allows
this insurance to be extended even beyond the time spell covered by the employment
relation with the rm, compare the discussion on the e¢ cient bargaining model of the
union. Moreover, the political decision making process within the union, where senior
and junior workers have to compromise on the distribution of the rents, is likely to
generate support for an egalitarian outcome, as implied by the median voter model.8
All these arguments suggest that the LIFO model is probably a more appropriate
description of a non-union than of a unionized environment. These arguments can
also explain, why tenure proles seem to be atter in unionized rms, in contrast to
what Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) seem to predict, see e.g. Teulings
and Hartog (1998: 225).
6This problem has been suggested to us by Kevin Murphy.
7The reverse is not necessarily true. An inframarginal worker can bargain a wage above her
productivity, if workers with lower seniority capture less than their full productivity. In that case,
the rm has an incentive not to re the inframarginal worker because it rst has to re the marginal
worker.
8Equation (3) implies a Pareto distribution of wages within the rm, which is heavily skewed to
the right.
17
3 Empirical framework
The model discussed in the previous section has three testable implications:
1. Gibrats law: log rm size nt follows a random walk. This should hold better
when the distance between the hiring and ring boundaries is small. We use
various standard procedures to test for Gibrats law for log rm sizes.
2. The Last-in-First-Out separation rule: the workers hired last, leave the rm
rst. Note that we apply an e¢ cient bargaining model. Hence, the observational
distinction between quits and layo¤s is arbitrary, compare McLaughlin (1991).
As long as there is a positive surplus of the workers marginal revenue to the rm
above the workers reservation wage, the worker and the rm will strike a deal.
As soon as this surplus has vanished, it is in their mutual interest to separate.
Whether the separation is initiated by the worker or by the rm is irrelevant.
Hence, the model predicts the LIFO separation rule to apply to separations
as a whole, not just to layo¤s separately. We use duration analysis to test
this for this implication. Furthermore, we test one cross country implication.
Our theoretical model predicts that EPL raises the distance between the hiring
and the ring threshold, and hence the expected completed job tenure. Since
Portugal has a much stricter EPL, one would expect tenure to be higher there
than in Denmark.
3. The dependency of wages on seniority: wages depend on a workers seniority in
the rm, relative to his colleagues, see equation (3). We use wage regressions,
both in levels and in rst di¤erences, to test this implication. Moreover, the
higher the monopoly power of the rm,  1, the higher should be the return
to seniority. We use variation in the estimated return to seniority between
industries to test this implication.
The challenging aspect of this paper is testing the second and third implication.
For that purpose, we need longitudinal matched worker rm data. Only by knowing
the tenure distribution of the entire workforce of the rm, at all times, we can calculate
the seniority of a worker. Though using this type of data has become more fashionable
in recent years, they are still not widely available. We have been able to get access to
such data on Denmark and Portugal. The two countries are a nice combination since
their level of employment protection di¤ers widely. We give a description of both
data sets and the relevant institutions from these countries in the next subsection.
Subsequently, we discuss the test of the three implications of our model, each in a
separate subsection.
3.1 Data and relevant labour market institutions
For Denmark, we use the Integrated Database for labor Market Research (IDA) for
1980-2001, from the Danish Bureau of Statistics, which has been used previously e.g.
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in Mortensen (2003). IDA tracks every single individual between 15 and 74 years
old. The labor market status of each person is recorded once a year, at November
30. The dataset contains a plant identier, which allows the construction of the total
workforce of a plant, and hence of the rm as a whole. There is information on
earnings, occupation, education, and age, and on the plants location, rm size, and
industry. Industry is dened as the industry employing the largest share of the rms
workforce. Firm size is dened as the number of individuals holding primary jobs in
that rm and earning a positive wage. The tenure of workers hired since 1980 can be
calculated straightforwardly from the IDA. For workers hired between 1964 and 1980,
the tenure can be calculated from a second dataset on the contribution histories to a
mandatory pension program, the ATP. The tenure in job spells started before 1964
is left censored (less than 3% of the observations). We calculate potential experience
as age-schooling-6.
For Portugal, we use the Quadros de Pessoal for 1991-2000 provided by the Min-
istry of Employment, which has been used before e.g. in Cabral and Mata (2003). It
is based on a compulsory survey of rms, establishments and all their workers; the
compulsory participation enhances the quality of the data. The information available
is similar to that for Denmark except that workerstenure is directly reported and
rm size is measured by sales when available, otherwise by employment; the industry
of the rm is that industry with the highest share of sales or, when the allocation
by sales is not possible, the industry with the highest employment share. We use
all full-time employees in their main job, aged between 16 and 66, and working for
a rm located in Portugals mainland. The hourly gross earnings were computed as
the monthly base-wage plus seniority-indexed components plus other regularly paid
components, divided by normal hours of work per month.
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For both countries, we use data for all private sector jobs, except agriculture,
shing and mining. We eliminate outliers by deleting all wage observations lower than
the legal minimum wage for each year and drop the top 1% of the wage distribution.
Summary statistics for both countries are presented in Table 1, both for the pooled
data and for 2000 separately9. There are several obvious di¤erences between the
two countries. The mean level of education is more than 5 years higher in Denmark
than in Portugal, while the mean tenure is almost 3 years longer in Portugal than in
Denmark. The number of rms is far higher in Portugal than in Denmark, and the
average rm size in Portugal is only 30% of that in Denmark. Finally, Danes earn on
average almost six times more than Portuguese.
Denmark and Portugal are both members of the European Union, both small
open economies, and both with (in EU terms) low unemployment rates over recent
years, see Nickell et al (2005). The two countries di¤er substantially with respect to
their labour market exibility and social safety net. In Denmark, wage bargaining is
de facto done at the rm level over the observation period, although there are some
collective industry-level bargaining agreements for minimum wages, see Kenworthy
(2001). The Danish private labor market is characterized by very low EPL compared
to most OECD countries, but similar to the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia, see OECD Employment Outlook (2004). The EPL applicable to privately
owned rms is limited to basic provisions such as white-collar workers being given an
advance notice and a minimum of EU enacted rules relating to mass layo¤s. General
rules and procedures for dismissal are absent, see also Albaek et al (1999). Unemploy-
ment benets for wage earners are high and can be obtained for a long period, being
generous compared to most other countries. In Portugal, wage negotiations start at
the national level, dening a national minimum standard and setting guidelines for
collective bargaining at a lower level. Massive collective agreements dominate the
labor market as a result of extension mechanisms. However, individual rms are able
to pay higher wages than those bargained at the aggregate level, see Cardoso and
Portugal (2005). The EPL in Portugal is the other extreme compared to Denmark:
according to the OECD Employment Outlook (2004), Portugal has the about highest
overall summary index of all countries. The notice period for layo¤ is 60 days, and the
severance pay for individual dismissals is 1 month per year of service, with a minimum
indemnity of 3 months. The minimum duration of any contract is 6 months, although
the law denes some exceptions. Following an unjustied dismissal the worker can
be reinstated or compensated. The maximum duration of benets in Portugal varies
from 10 months for people aged under 25 and 30 months for those aged above 45.
The replacement rate is 65 % of the previous wage, but the benet cannot be below
the minimum wage or above 3 times the minimum wage.
9Summary statistics for each separate industry (see Appendix B for our broad industry classi-
cation) are available upon request.
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3.2 Testing Gibrats law
Our theoretical model predicts log employment size of rm j, njt, to follow a random
walk, apart from the dampening e¤ect of the hiring and ring boundary on short
run uctuations in njt. This regularity is known as Gibrats law. Though slight
deviations from Gibrats law do not a¤ect the main economic implications of the
theoretical model, it is useful to have at least some idea how close this assumption
is in the data. There is a massive literature on testing Gibrats law, see e.g. De Wit
(2005) or Sutton (1997). Here, we use two tests.
The rst approach is laid out in Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward
(1992) for log wages; we adapt this methodology for log rmsizes. First, we estimate
njt = 0 + 1Zjt + "jt (10)
where  is the rst di¤erence operator and where Zjt is vector of controls: age
category of the rm, time e¤ects and industry indicators. Second, we construct the
autocovariance matrix of the residuals "jt of this regression. If njt follows a random
walk, "jt should be uncorrelated across time t.
The resulting covariograms for (10) are reported in Table 2, both for the whole
sample of rms and for the subsample of larger rms (at least 20 employees each year
over the sample period of that rm). The evidence from Table 2. suggests that the
process characterizing the residuals in rm size changes is very close to a random
walk, except for the case of Denmark when including the small rms (column 2). In
Portugal the residual auto-covariogram support the specication of an autoregressive
process very close to a unit root, although when using only the subsample of larger
rms we nd evidence of mild positive serial correlation in rst di¤erences.
The second approach follows the literature on testing for unit roots in panel data.
Breitung-Meyer (1994) and Bond et al. (2005) show that for micro panels with large
cross-sectional and small time dimension, OLS in levels is consistent and typically
more e¢ cient than more complex GMM and ML estimators. Consider a simple dy-
namic AR(1) panel data model, where for expositional brevity we do not include any
covariates (in the estimation we use specications where we control for age category
of the rm, industry and time e¤ects):
njt = nj;t 1 + ujt, (11)
where ujt  (1   )j + vjt and the initial rm size nj1 = 0 + 1j + "jj, with
jt and j error terms such that E(j) =E(vjt) = 0 and E(vjtvjs) = 0 for t 6=
s. Mean stationarity in (11) requires  < 1, 0 = 0 and 1 = 1. In addition,
covariance stationarity requires homoskedasticity over time of vjt, i.e. Var(vjt) = 2vj
and Var("j) = 2vj=(1   2). Bond et al (2005) show that under the null of  = 1
the OLS estimator of  in (11) is consistent. We refer to this estimator of  as the
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Table 2: 1st Gibrats Law Test: Residual Autocovariances
Denmark Portugal
Lag (1) (2) (1) (2)
0 0.1587 0.0424 0.1162 0.0255
(0.0005) (0.0112) (0.0005) (0.0007)
1 -0.0030 -0.00003 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003)
2 -0.0094 -0.0008 -0.0024 0.0012
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
3 -0.0020 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
4 -0.0016 -0.00004 -0.0008 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
5 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
6 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
N obs generating reg 1505926 79425 878919 66369
Specication (1) uses all the rms; specication (2) uses all rms that have at
least 20 employees in each year of their life spans. All generating regressions
use the rst di¤erenced log rm size as dependent variable and control for age
of the rm, time and industry e¤ects. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
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OLS estimator. Under the alternative  < 1, the OLS estimator is biased upwards;
this is more the case when Var(j)=Var(vjt) is large. In cases where this di¤erence in
the variances is high, one could use the transformed statistic in Breitung and Meyer
(1994), which estimates  from a transformed version of (11):
njt   nj1 = (nj;t 1   nj1) + "jt (12)
where "jt = vjt   (1   )
 
nj1   j

. The OLS estimator of (12) above is consistent
again under the null and again upwards biased under the alternative  < 1, but
this time the asymptotic bias does not depend on Var(j)=Var(vjt) when the process
is mean stationary. The t tests based on these two estimators should be considered
jointly when testing for the unit root and that tests based on other estimators that
are consistent under both the null and under certain alternatives are found to have
less power. For the purpose of our exercise, estimating  by least squares both in
(11) and in (12) would provide a good indication whether the process is close to a
random walk.
Table 3: 2nd Gibrats Law Test: Unit Root Type Regressions
Denmark Portugal
all rms large rms all rms large rms
Coef OLS1 BM1 OLS2 BM2 OLS1 BM1 OLS2 BM2
 .9361 .9208 .9755 .9806 .9594 .9537 .9791 1.043
(.0003) (.0006) (.0012) (.0030) (.0004) (.0009) (.0011) (.0030)
N obs 1505926 79425 878934 66340
R2 0.87 0.70 0.95 0.82 0.91 0.66 0.96 0.84
MSE 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.17
The dependent variable is logrmsize in OLS columns and (logrmsize-initial
logrmsize) in BM columns. Columns indexed 1 correspond to estimates using
the sample of all rms, while columns 2 correspond to the sample of rms with
at least 20 employees in each year of their life spans. Both regressions control
for age of the rm, time and industry e¤ects. (Robust standard errors in
parentheses).
The results of the regressions in (11) and (12) are shown in Table 3, for the
methodologies of both Bond et.al. (2005) and Breitung and Meyer (1994), and both
for the sample using all rms and the sample with only the large rms. The results
are very similar to those in Table 2. Looking at the estimates for Denmark, the
conclusions from the rst Gibrat test are conrmed. While the coe¢ cient on the rst
lag is somewhat lower than unity when using the sample of all rms, it approaches
the unit root once we look at the subsample of large rms. The value for the MSE,
a good estimate for the parameter  of the theoretical model, is very similar for
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both countries; it is quite large (0.40) for the whole sample, but it is about half of
that (0.20) for the subsample of larger rms, suggesting a lot of variation due to
small rms. This conrms results from previous literature that Gibrats law is more
accurate for large rms, e.g. Jovanovic (1982). Similar conclusions hold for Portugal,
where in the subsample of large rms we seem to be closer to the unit root. We
conclude that the Gibrat law holds for large rms in both countries, while there is
some mean reversion for small rms, in particular in Denmark.
3.3 Testing the LIFO separation rule
Next, we turn to the second prediction of our model, the LIFO separation rule. Let
the function j(i; t) denote the rm j in which worker i is employed in period t. We
drop the arguments of this function whenever the identication of the individual and
the period of observation are clear. The seniority level qijt is dened as the log of
number of workers employed at rm j (i; t) at time t at least as long as or longer than
worker i; hence, this number includes worker i herself. Hence, qijt is equal to njt at
the moment t when worker i is hired (assuming that i is the only one hired at time
t). Furthermore, for the most senior worker qijt = 0 because there is only one worker
who is employed at the rm as least as long as herself. Then, the seniority index rijt
is dened as the log of the ratio of the number of people employed at least as long as
worker i to the size of rm j at time t, in logs
rijt  njt   qijt: (13)
The seniority index rijt is a reasonable proxy for the variable zt   q, since zt is
equal to nt, up to a constant, p, and except for the insulation of nt from shocks
in zt when p  < pt < p+, recall the setup of our theoretical model. Were the
LIFO separation rule to apply literally, the seniority index rijt would be the only
determinant of separation. However, there are two reasons why this is not likely to
be the case. First, the workforce of the rm is not completely homogeneous, so that
a rm may wish to diminish its workforce in one skill class but not necessarily for
other skill classes employed within that rm. This may disrupt a strict application
of the LIFO separation rule. Second, workers separate not only due to shocks of the
demand for the rms product, but also due to worker specic shocks, e.g. when a
workers partner gets a new job in another city, that causes the worker to quit from
his or her current job. A particularly important worker specic factor that does not
t in the LIFO model is retirement. Hence, our ambition is more limited than what
would follow from a strict interpretation of the LIFO separation rule. We just want
to show that rijt has a strong impact on the job separation rate.
We model the transition process by a mixed proportional hazard rates model with
discrete time periods. This implies that the conditional probability of leaving the
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rm (i.e. the hazard rate) after Tijt years of tenure can be written as:
(rijt; Zijt; Tijt; vi) =
exp

rijt + Zijt +  Tijt + vi

1 + exp

rijt + Zijt +  Tijt + vi
 (14)
where Zijt is a vector of observed characteristics of the individual and the job, and
where vi represents the unobserved worker heterogeneity. We include a full set of
dummies  T for every tenure category, which is equivalent to a fully exible speci-
cation of the baseline hazard. Identication of the parameter  of the seniority index
rijt separate of the parameters of the baseline hazard  T requires variation in rijt that
is independent of the tenure Tijt. Such independent variation is available since the
seniority index also depends on the hiring and ring of other workers and hence is a
non-deterministic function of tenure. A LIFO separation rule implies that  should
be negative. For our estimation method we use a two mass-point distribution for
the unobserved heterogeneity. We use up to 10 spells of an individual, which helps
to estimate the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. The main reason for using
a discrete time model is practical. For Denmark, the worker is observed only once
per year. Hence, we cannot observe the exact moment at which the worker enters
or leaves the rm.10 In addition, short spells are underrepresented since a worker
has to stay at least till the next period of observation. With the data at hand, we
cannot correct for these problems in a continuous time model and even though we do
not claim that a discrete time analysis solves all these problems, this is the simplest
accurate representation of the data.
As noted before, older workers may leave the rm for retirement. This process
is likely to run counter to the LIFO separation rule, since retired workers tend to
have long tenures. Therefore, we exclude workers above the age of 55 from the
analysis. Spells started before the age of 55 and nished afterwards are therefore
right censored. Women are also more likely to leave the rm for non-participation.
Hence, we separate our results for men and women. We delete spells that are left
censored since we cannot compute the seniority of an individual for the periods before
she enters our observation sample. Since this seniority a¤ects the probability that the
individual survives till the start of the sample period, we cannot easily correct for left
censoring. Deleting the left-censored spells implies that we have a maximum of 22
years of tenure in Denmark and 10 for Portugal. The vector Zijt includes education,
potential experience and indicators for region, industry and occupation.
Table 4 lists the main results. We nd a negative and signicant impact of se-
niority for both women and men, with small di¤erences between these categories,
in both Denmark and Portugal, in accordance with the LIFO separation rule. Fur-
thermore, education and experience have a negative impact on the job separation
10For Portugal, tenures is reported in months. We use this information in the estimation. For the
rest, the modelling is identical to that for Denmark.
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hazard. Though the actual coe¢ cients are not reported here, we also nd negative
duration dependence and evidence of unobserved heterogeneity, in both countries.11
Apparently, seniority does not pick up all the variation in separation rates over the
course of a job spell. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. First, as
noted before, our seniority index might not exactly correspond to the actual layo¤
ordering, since the rms workforce is likely to be heterogeneous with separate LIFO
ordering to apply to subsets of the workforce. This is equivalent to measurement
error in our seniority index rijt, leading to an attenuation bias in the estimate of 
and unobserved variation in the seniority index being picked up by correlated vari-
ables, i.e. the tenure dummies  T . Second, not all separations are driven by the
uctuations in the demand for the rms product, and hence, the log seniority index.
In particular, some separations are driven by the worker and the rm learning about
the quality of the match. This learning process leads to hump shape hazard, with
many separations early on and a quickly declining hazard for higher elapsed tenures,
see Jovanovic (1979).
The analysis in Section 2.8 shows that ring cost increases the expected duration
of job spells. Since EPL is more stringent in Portugal than in Denmark, one would
expect longer job durations in Portugal. In Figure 2 below, we present the estimated
cumulative distribution of completed tenures for job spell of a male with 12 years of
education which started at the age of 25 and rijt = 0 along the whole spell, for both
Denmark and Portugal. Indeed, the expected tenure is clearly higher in Portugal
than in Denmark. This conclusion generalizes to any other type of worker.
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 5 10 15 20
Tim e
Denm ark Portugal
Figure 2: CDF expected completed tenure Denmark and Portugal
3.4 Testing dependency of wages on seniority
The third and main prediction of the model is the dependency of wages on seniority.
This can be tested by extending the standard specication of the log earnings equa-
11The full estimation results are available upon request.
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Table 4: Main results LIFO test
Denmark Portugal
Males Females Males Females
Logrank -0.0577 -0.0357 -0.0549 -0.0669
(0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0065)
Education -0.1169 -0.1267 -0.1204 -0.1446
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Experience -0.0771 -0.0732 -0.0490 -0.0656
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
N obs 10788368 5990891 2118405 1488687
The estimation also controls for occupation, region and industry
indicators. (Standard errors in parantheses)
tion with the seniority index, rijt, as dened in (13) above. Consider the following
specication of log wages wijt
wijt = + Xijt + Tijt + rijt + njt + "ijt; (15)
where Xijt is experience. We omit higher order terms in experience and tenure and
other controls (including time e¤ects) from equation (15) for the sake of convenience,
but include them in the estimation. The unobservable term can be decomposed into
four orthogonal components, a match, a rm, a worker, and an idiosyncratic e¤ect12
"ijt = 'ij +  j + i + ijt: (16)
The idiosyncratic e¤ect ijt can also include measurement error. There are all kinds
of reasons for ij;  j; and i to be correlated to Tijt, see Topel (1991) or Altonji
and Williams (2005): good worker-rm relationships tend to survive as the worker
and the rm learn about the quality of their match and bad matches are broken up,
leading to a positive correlation between 'ij+ j+i and Tijt. Search theories imply
that workers sample new jobs from a job o¤er distribution. The longer this selection
process is going on, the higher the expected value of 'ij +  j since bad jobs do not
survive, leading to a positive correlation between 'ij +  j and Tijt. There are two
obvious solutions to this problem, either within-job rst di¤erencing (FD) or adding
xed e¤ects for every job spell (FE). First di¤erencing yields
wijt = +  + rijt + njt +ijt: (17)
Adding xed e¤ects per job spell is equivalent to estimating (15) by taking deviations
from the mean over time, within a job spell:
ewijt = (+ ) eTijt + erijt + enjt + eijt; (18)
12This formulation is similar to Topel (1991: 150), except that we add a rm e¤ect and that we
delete the subscript t from the match e¤ect ij , as Topel does in his application.
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where the upper tilde denotes deviations from the mean per job spell, e.g. ewijt =
wijt wijt, with wijt the mean over time of wijt. We exclude eXijt from (18) because it is
perfectly collinear with eTijt. In both specications above, it is immediately clear that
the rst order e¤ects of tenure and experience are not separately identied. However,
this problem does not a¤ect the estimation of , since rijt is not perfectly correlated
to Tijt. The choice between the FE and FD estimators above depends on the error
structure of vijt. The closer is vijt to a unit root, the more e¢ cient is the FD method;
the closer vijt is to being serially uncorrelated, the more e¢ cient estimation method
is the FE estimator. Previous empirical studies have typically found a high degree
of autocorrelation in vijt, even close to a unit root, see for instance Abowd and Card
(1979) and Topel and Ward (1992). From that perspective, equation (17) is likely to
be most e¢ cient. However, this equation assumes that the e¤ect of rijt and njt on wijt
is immediate. Any lagged impact will not be captured after rst di¤erencing. From
that perspective, equation (18) is preferred, since there lagged e¤ects of rijt and njt
will be captured. Hence, one would expect higher estimates for  and  from using
equation (18) than from (17).13 In the strict version of our model, where separation is
completely governed by the LIFO separation rule, rijt and njt are perfectly correlated
within a job spell, since more senior workers will never leave the rm before worker
i, so that the only variation in rijt comes from variation in njt. The same argument
applies to erijt and enjt. Hence,  and  are not separately identied in that world
neither in equation (17) nor in (18). Happily, LIFO does not apply in a strict sense.
The most compelling reason for a violation of the LIFO separation rule is workers
retirement, but also other individual specic shocks discussed earlier in this section.
These separations allow separate identication of  and  with FE and FD estimators.
First, we check the characteristics of the dynamic process of vijt. Table 5 reports
the variance-covariance ofvijt, analogous to what we did for log rm sizes in Table 2.
For both countries, the covariance of "ijt with its rst lag is substantial, the covariance
with higher lags is negligible. Hence, the process is well approximated by an MA(1)
process, made up of a mixture permanent and transitory shocks. Abowd and Card
(1979) and Topel and Ward (1992) nd similar results for the United States. The
standard deviation of the permanent shocks can be calculated as 0.12 for Denmark
and 0.10 for Portugal.14 These numbers are of the same order of magnitude as found
for the United States.
13We report robust standard errors, so that correlation between the residuals over time does not
a¤ect their validity.
14Let qijt and uijt be the transitory and permanent shock respectively. Then:
vijt = uijt + qijt   qij;t 1:
Hence: Var(vijt) =Var(uijt) + 2Var(qijt) and Cov(vijt;vij;t 1) =  Var(qijt), so that:
Var(uijt) =Var(vijt) + 2Cov(vijt;vij;t 1).
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Table 5: Residual Autocovariances for Within-Job LogWage Innovations
Lag Denmark Portugal
0 0.0231 0.0273
(0.00002) (0.00007)
1 -0.0043 -0.0082
(0.00001) (0.00006)
2 -0.0006 -0.0008
(8.7e-06) (0.00003)
3 -0.0003 -0.0004
(9.0e-06) (0.00003)
4 -0.0003 9.2e-06
(9.5e-06) (0.00003)
5 -0.00008 -0.00008
(0.00001) (0.00004)
6 -0.0001 -0.0006
(0.00001) (0.00005)
N obs generating reg 14907897 5758655
The generating regressions are the FD wage regressions with logrank includes, see the
FD2 columns in the next table. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
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This evidence suggests that in terms of e¢ ciency of the estimation method we
might prefer FD, while in terms of allowing for a lagged e¤ect of rijt on wijt we
might prefer FE. Hence, we report both the FD and FE estimator. Our regressions
control for up to quartic terms in tenure and experience, log rmsize and industry,
occupation, and region dummies. In Table 6 we report the results15. We present the
estimation results for two specications, one excluding log seniority rijt and another
including it. We can draw the following conclusions. First, all coe¢ cients for log
seniority are positive and statistically signicant. Second, the coe¢ cients are larger
for FE than for FD, as was expected because FE allows for a lagged e¤ect of rijt on
wijt, while FD does not. Third, comparing the estimation results with and without
seniority, including seniority reduces the estimates for the rst order e¤ect of tenure
+ experience and for log rmsize by 5-30 %. The coe¢ cients for the higher order
e¤ects of tenure and experience are hardly a¤ected by including seniority. The e¤ect
of log rmsize and tenure on wages is at least partly a proxy for the e¤ect of seniority.
Of the three variables, tenure, rm size, and seniority, we can expect seniority to be
measured with the greatest amount of measurement error. Apart from straightforward
reporting errors, the main source of measurement error in tenure is who exactly is
the relevant employer. Some job changes might either be classied as between rms,
justifying the tenure clock being set back to zero, or as within the rm, which does
not a¤ect the tenure clock. However, this source of measurement error only a¤ects
changes at the borderline of the denition of a rm. This is likely to be only a small
fraction of the rms workforce. However, misclassication of the tenure of even a
single worker can a¤ect the measurement of the seniority of all other workers of the
rm. In general, any measurement error in tenure or rm size automatically feeds into
seniority, while on top of that, seniority is also a¤ected by measurement errors because
separate seniority statistics are likely to apply for subgroups of the workforce. Both
the upward e¤ect on the coe¢ cients for tenure and log rm size and downward e¤ect
on the coe¢ cient for seniority of the measurement error in seniority can therefore be
expected to be substantial. Finally, the e¤ect of seniority is twice as high in Portugal
as in Denmark.16 It is tempting to link this di¤erence between Denmark and Portugal
to the di¤erences in EPL in both countries, but our theoretical model does not allow
for a link between the bargaining power  and the ring cost W .
15Results for the same analysis performed for each of the broad industry categories dened in
Appendix B are qualitatively identical (with some heterogeneity in the magnitude of the estimated
seniority coe¢ cients, among the various industries) to the results at the national level in Table 6.
They are available upon request from the authors.
16A corrolary of that is that also the return to tenure is very low in Denmark, compared to
most other countries, and certainly so when compared to Portugal. The fact that the common
linear e¤ect of tenure and experience is further reduced when accounting for seniority rank suggests
however that seniority rank, keeping in mind the proportions, is a much more important factor
in wage determination than tenure (whose still signicant impact, is in our interpretation due to
measurement error in seniority).
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3.4.1 Returns to seniority within gender and education subgroups
We repeat the analysis separately for males and females, and for low- and high-
educated workers. The results are reported in Table 7. The results for male and
female categories do not di¤er much. The only apparent exception is for Denmark,
when using the FE estimator, where the estimated coe¢ cient for males is twice as high
as for females, though they are the same when using the FD estimator. At the same
time, and linked to the previous observation, the estimates by gender categories really
do not di¤er much from the estimate when using the whole samples, for either country.
Our interpretation is therefore that seniority positions within gender categories are
not more relevant for wage determination than the seniority position within the rm
as a whole and hence splitting by gender is not likely to attenuate the measurement
error in seniority index. The estimation results for education groups show that the
e¤ect of seniority is much larger for higher educated workers than for low educated
workers. The impact of seniority on wages is lower for the low-educated workers,
compared to corresponding estimates from Table 6, and the FE estimate is even
signicantly negative for Denmark, though small in absolute value. The impact of
seniority on wages within the high educated group is much larger, both in Denmark
and in Portugal. These results are consistent with the fact that high educated workers
have steeper wage-tenure proles than their low-educated peers. At the same time,
they give support to the fact that the relevant seniority hierarchy within the rm is
already more realistically captured when accounting for education levels.
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3.4.2 Returns to seniority and rm monopoly power
Our theoretical model also predicts that the return to seniority, =, is partly driven
by the degree of monopoly power,  1. We test this hypothesis by analyzing whether
the variation in the return to seniority across industries can be explained by the de-
gree of monopoly power in each industry. We take the log of the number of rms in
each industry as proxy for the degree of monopoly power. We regress the estimated
coe¢ cient for seniority for each industry on this log number of rms and a constant
term, using both simple OLS and Weighted Least Squares (WLS) specications. We
use two measures as "number of rms" in an industry: the sum of all rms that were
at any time active in that industry during the sample period, and respectively, the
median number of rms over the sample period. We use two industries classications,
a broad classication with 12 industries for Denmark and 11 for Portugal, see Appen-
dix B, and a more rened classication where we use all 2-digit Standard Industry
Classication (SIC) industry sub-categories available, increasing the number of obser-
vations in the regressions to 40 for Denmark and 49 for Portugal. For our prediction
to be veried, we expect negative estimates of the coe¢ cients of log number of rms.
The estimation results for the regressions of returns to seniority on the log number
of rms by industry are presented in Table 8. Most of the estimated coe¢ cients
of interest are not signicantly di¤erent from 0 (though most slightly negative in
magnitude), both when using the WLS and the OLS methods and regardless of using
as dependent variables the FD or the FE coe¢ cients previously estimated in this
paper, and as independent variables the sum or the median of the number rms in an
industry. There are very few cases where the results are statistically signicant: when
using the broad industry categories for Portugal we get signicant coe¢ cients of the
expected sign with the FE method, but signicant coe¢ cients of the opposite sign in
Denmark; when using the OLS for 2-digit industries in Portugal we get signicantly
positive coe¢ cients for the FD method and again signicantly positive when using the
WLS for the FD, sum of rms, and FE, median of rms. In conclusion, we regard this
test as inconclusive. The explanatory variables used as proxy for the monopoly power
of an industry are not strong enough to isolate the e¤ect of the degree of monopoly
power on the return to seniority.
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4 Summary and conclusions
What have we established beyond reasonable doubt in this paper? We have shown
that for Denmark and Portugal part of what has been known as the wage return to
tenure is in fact a return to seniority, that is, the position of the worker in the tenure
hierarchy of her rm. This implies that standard explanations of the return to tenure,
like Jovanovics learning or the classic search models, and subsequent versions of these
models, cannot provide the full story, if only because these explanations focus solely
on the features of the worker herself (in case of learning, her ability; in case of search,
her job o¤er history), while the return to seniority links the fate of the worker to that
of the rm as a whole. A return to seniority implies that a worker is to some extent
shareholder in her own rm. Hence, it makes the link between labor economics and
nance.
Our theoretical model provides a special interpretation of the return to seniority, as
being due to a hold up problem, where rms pay the full cost of the specic investment,
while workers capture part of the return. This setup leads to ine¢ ciently low hiring.
All these conclusions are conditional on the assumption that the rm bears the full
cost of specic investments, an assumption that has not been tested empirically in
this paper. How to do that remains an open question. An indirect answer can be
obtained by analysing who is queueing for whom: when workers queue for jobs, so
that there is unemployment, rms are held up by their incumbent workforce; when
it is the other way around, and there are vacancies, workers are held up by their
employer. As long as workers are risk neutral and either investment or wages are
contractible, e¢ cient hiring can be obtained by using the sharing rule of the costs for
the one, to mirror the sharing rule for the other, thereby satisfying the Hosios (1990)
condition. When workers are risk averse, e¢ ciency can only be obtained when both
investment and wages are contractible, such that the costs of investment are fully
attributed to the rm and there is no seniority prole. Any other allocation assigns
part of the risky return to the risk averse player. In that sense, our estimation results
point to incompleteness in the insurance market. Nevertheless, our analysis does not
imply that LIFO layo¤ rules are bad per se. They can o¤er a useful protection to
the property rights of incumbent workers on their share of the specic investment,
thereby helping the rm to solve a commitment problem. Without a resolution of
this commitment problem, incumbents would have all reasons not to cooperate in the
transfer of tacit knowledge to newly hired workers.
We have established the existence of a return to seniority for Denmark and Por-
tugal. Whether such a return exists in other countries, in particular in the United
States, remains an open question. We bet it does; the large return to tenure in the
United States as compared to Denmark and Portugal strongly suggests so. One might
argue that returns to seniority are largely driven by legal institutions, and that these
institutions are entirely di¤erent and more market oriented in the United States. We
think however that the economic mechanisms for having a LIFO layo¤ rule exist
everywhere, and that the legal institutions might very well just be a formalisation of
37
rules of conduct and implicit contracts that would have emerged anyway.
The return to seniority is twice as high in Portugal than in Denmark. It is tempting
to relate this di¤erence to the much more extensive Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL) in the Portugal. Nevertheless, this does not follow from our theoretical
model. Compared to, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), our analysis has the
advantage that it allows for the e¤ect of EPL on wages, but this does not imply a
higher return to seniority. What would be an interesting extension of our analysis is
to allow for the fact that empirically EPL goes up with tenure. Till sofar, including
this feature in theoretical models was cumbersome from an analytical point of view,
but in the framework presented here this is likely to be doable. With an eye on the
missing market for elderly workers in many European countries, this seems to be a
worthwhile extension. We leave this for future research.
Our model suggests that hold up problems reduce turnover, and thereby specic
investment (because turnover requires new specic investment to be made). This
conclusion is contingent on the way specic investment is modelled here, namely as a
xed amount to be invested in one-shot at the beginning of the job. When the amount
of investment can vary both in size and in timing, this conclusion might change. Then,
a longer expected job duration might invoke more specic investment, which in turn
would lengthen the expected job duration since the productivity at the job is raised
relative to the productivity at the outside market. In such a world, a rm responds
along two margins of adjustment, when the demand for its product goes up. First, it
will hire additional workers, and second, it will expand the specic investment in its
incumbent workforce. This model would provide further legitimation for a LIFO rule,
not as legal constraint, but as an e¢ cient economic institution. Again, we postpone
this for future research.
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A Derivation
Equation (6) can be written as
0=
 
    R   +      C         C+; (19)
0=
 
    R    +       C         +C+; 
     I =      ER   E +      E C         E+C+;
0=
 
    ER   E +       E C         +E+C+;
where
   < 0; +  + > 1;   
 

< 0;  p+   p 
C B  exp  p  ; C+  B+ exp +p  ; R  r   1 1 exp p     > 0;
E exp [] ; E  exp [] ; E   exp

 

; E+  exp + :
Elimination of C  yields:
0=
 
    1R          +C+; (20) 
     I =        E   E R    E   E          E+   E C+;
0=
 
      E    E R    E    E          +E+    E C+:
Rewriting the rst equation yields equation (7). The system of equations (20) can be
rewritten as a system of linear equation in R;C+; and (    ) I24 RC+
(    ) I
35= 
24     1   (    +) 0(    )D0    (    )D+   1
(    )D10   (    )D+  0
35 1 24 1D 
D 
35 (21)
D0 E   E ; D+   E+   E ; D   E   E ;
D10 E    E ; D+   +E+    E ; D   E    E :
Since R > 0, the rst equation of the solution to equation (21) implies that 
+    D10   1   D+  =  +  E+   E++   E+   E     E   E  < 0
Hence,  and C+ should be positive for a solution to exist. The third equation of
this system reads
I =
 
    

(    ) (D0 D+   D+ D10 )
(+    )D10    (1   )D+  +
(+    )D0    (1   )D+ 
(+    )D10    (1   )D+ D   D 

 I (; ) :
(22)
which is an implicit equation in . Since
I (0; )= 0; I (1; ) =1;
I (; )> 0; I (; ) < 0;
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a unique positive solution for  exist for every I > 0, and d=d is positive.
With ring cost, the rst equation of (19) reads
       W =      R   +      C         C+:
Elimination of C  yields
  W =      1R          +C+:
This can be written as24 RC+
(    ) I
35 =  
24     1   (    +) 0(    )D0    (    )D+   1
(    )D10   (    )D+  0
35 1 241  WD 
D 
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All conclusions in the text follow from this equation.
B Broad industry categories
1. Manufacturing
2. Electricity, gas and water supply
3. Construction
4. Wholesale and retail trade; repairs
5. Hotels and restaurants
6. Transport, post and communications
7. Financial intermediation
8. Real estate, renting and business activities
9. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security
10. Education
11. Health and social work
12. Other community, social and personal service activities
Note: For Portugal we miss category 9 (no rms are privately owned in that
sector).
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